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In February 2003, the United Nations, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and 
the Swiss Federal Office of Sports, convened an international conference on ‘Sport and 
Development’ that was held in Magglingen, Switzerland. Over 380 conference delegates from 55 
nations were in attendance, representing governmental bodies, the United Nations system, 
athletes, sports organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), scientific research 
institutes, and media corporations. The conference followed at least two others that had 
spotlighted sport, human rights and development issues.1 The Magglingen convention, however, 
brought a fresh political impetus to the sports–human rights relationship. The chairpersons of 
the various conference sessions reported the conclusions that had emerged; these points were 
incorporated within the ‘Magglingen Declaration and Recommendations’, a document that was 
submitted in turn to the United Nations for implementation. 
The hosting of these conventions has certainly been inspired by the belief of international 
organizations that sport may be utilized to achieve positive social outcomes. According to the 
Red Cross in Indo-China, ‘Sport transforms men and women by endowing them with strength, 
endurance, vivacity and courage’. For the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Sadako Ogata said, ‘Sports and recreation are vital for all children. For a refugee child 
they are irreplaceable in helping rebuild a destroyed world.’ The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations now has a Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace. According to the 
current incumbent, Adolf Ogi, a former President of Switzerland: 
Sport teaches life skills. Sport remains the best school of life. With sport, 
young people learn: to manage victory; to overcome defeat; to become team 
 players and to be reliable and gain the other team members’ confidence; 
respect for opponents and the rules; that for good results regular training is 
needed; and, to know their limits and themselves better. The positive lessons 
and values of sport are essential for life.2 
Driven by these convictions, numerous international organizations have introduced various 
forms of sport-related work to promote peace, development and human dignity. Here are some 
examples of that work: 
1. The International Commission for the Red Cross (ICRC) has employed sports stars to 
publicise its anti-personnel mines campaign. 
2. The ICRC, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and other international federations 
have assisted victims of genocide in Rwanda. 
3. The International Labour Organization launched its ‘Red Card to Child Labour’ campaign at 
the 2002 African Nations Cup finals. In December 2002, the campaign was adopted by Real 
Madrid, notably for the club’s centennial exhibition fixture, generating extensive coverage in the 
Spanish media. 
4. Red Deporte y Cooperación was established in 1999, with headquarters in Madrid and the 
United States, with the aim of ‘educating values and promoting physical, intellectual and 
psychomotor skills and development amongst underprivileged youth through organized sport 
activities’.3 The main beneficiaries of the eight programmes that it runs in South America and 
sub-Saharan Africa are low income and high risk children and youths as well as specific groups 
of young women. 
5. In Colombia, the Fútbol por la Paz project was established through local sports associations to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate drug-addicted young people and those caught up in drug trafficking. 
6. Partnerships have been established between international federations and humanitarian NGOs, 
e.g. the IOC and the UNHCR, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and 
SOS-Children’s Villages. 
Now, there is no question that some remarkable sports-focused work is being done by NGOs in 
regard to reconciliation, peace-building, and rehabilitation work. The football schools in the 
Balkans are a particularly strong illustration.4 However, there are some significant problems in 
any argument that considers sport a priori to be a force for human goodness. 
First, the position taken by those such as Adolf Ogi is essentially a functionalist one, in that it 
assumes that sport meets crucial social needs and is a powerful and positive force for social 
integration. Of course, there is much historical counter-evidence to suggest that sport can just as 
 easily prove far more dysfunctional than functional to social order, in dramatizing or intensifying 
sources of social conflict, as expressed, for example, through nationalism, sexism, racism and 
other strains of xenophobia. 
Second, in their development and peace work the shift of ‘sport evangelists’ to locations outside 
the West may constitute a form of neo-colonial repositioning. Through the twentieth century, 
sports evangelism at home had sought to promote organized sporting activities to dissipate the 
lower orders’ dangerous energies and to divert them from ‘licentious’ social practices (such as 
drinking, gambling, casual sex, and the following of youth subcultural styles). There is little 
convincing evidence to suggest that such evangelism has proved wholly successful among young 
people in the West over the years. However, it appears to be assumed, the young people in the 
old colonies may be more readily organized to receive and internalize the tendentious, self-
controlling messages buried within sports. 
Third, even if we accept for argument’s sake that sport is a force for positive transformation, the 
focus of sporting humanitarianism tends to be heavily skewed towards meeting the needs of 
young people. My concern is that such prioritization, not least in the allocation of sport 
resources, is unnecessarily exclusionary towards other social cleavages, notably women and the 
old. 
Fourth, underlying all of these concerns are more fundamental questions regarding the cross-
cultural politics of sport humanitarianism. Is there sufficient dialogue between the donors and 
recipients before sports-related aid is offered? Are recipients sufficiently empowered to claim 
ownership over these projects? Ultimately, what are the complex dynamics of power and 
meaning behind cross-cultural ‘cooperation’ between donor and recipient groups? 
These problems were uppermost in our minds when we presented our paper to the Magglingen 
conference.5 In line with the conference’s remit, our discussion concluded in strongly practical 
mode by advancing recommendations for the deployment of sport in facilitating peaceful 
solutions within contexts of war, violence and social crisis. With a few minor emendations, these 
recommendations were adopted by conference delegates and included within the final 
declaration. 
To summarize these recommendations, we argued for: 
 • The expansion of sport programmes in conflict zones, to promote rehabilitation and 
reconciliation. 
• Dialogue between the donors and recipients of aid. Donors must receive the informed 
consent of recipients, whose members should include women, adults, the old and the 
disabled. 
• Reflection on the role of sports bodies and NGOs in promoting sport’s internationalism and 
humanitarian ethos, and its possible contributions to development. Ties between specific 
athletes and particular regions should be strengthened. 
• Sports bodies and other NGOs to evaluate projects before implementation, and to explore 
their sustainability and clarify long-term ownership. 
• The expansion of connections between NGOs and sports federations. 
But all of this required to take place alongside more direct strategies for alleviating famine, 
warfare, poverty and forced migration. 
In this brief discussion of issues relating to sport, human rights and development, I seek to build 
on these arguments by probing more deeply the kind of concerns raised in the fourth criticism, 
relating to the political and cross-cultural dimensions of sports projects. The discussion is 
divided into three main parts. I open by outlining how sport’s governing bodies relate to the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rise of a ‘culture of rights’. Second, I 
address the question of cross-cultural difficulties in establishing human rights cultures with 
reference to critical analysts of globalization. Third, I turn to conceptualize the interrelations 
between human rights, globalization and humankind with reference to the work of Robertson 
and Rorty. 
Sport, Human Rights and the 1948 Declaration 
The cornerstone of any discussion of human rights must be the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The Declaration itself is couched in the highly individualistic terms that are 
hegemonic within Western liberal democracies. With the very partial exception of Articles 28 and 
29, the 30 articles say hardly anything on collective rights, whether in regard to nation-states, 
international society or humankind. Explicit mention of sport is absent, although Article 24 does 
insist that ‘everyone has the right to rest and leisure’, while Article 27 highlights the individual’s 
‘right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community’. 
 For developing nations particularly, there is a grim irony in the historical processes that underlie 
the Declaration. The Western powers ‘discovered’ these other cultures, enslaved the peoples, 
expropriated their natural and human resources, and then, once such exploitation had proved 
too exhausting to maintain, the colonists introduced the colonized to notions of nationhood, 
political independence, free-market international trading, and human rights. Such hopeful 
guarantees of human dignity would have been perfectly unnecessary if this cycle of colonization 
and decolonization had never started in the first place. 
A more specific irony lies in sport’s historical contribution to the colonial subjugation of non-
Western cultures. Western sports institutions have been directly implicated in acts of cultural 
genocide. I mean this not only in the more general sense that Western sports were constituent 
parts of the colonial military–industrial complexes that enslaved or proletarianized whole 
societies. Rather, and more specifically, cultural genocide arose in the deliberate supplanting of 
non-Western body cultures with imperial games.6 In British imperial outposts, sport was utilized 
particularly by Christian missionaries and other imperial pedagogues to crush indigenous cultural 
identities and practices, to set about creating ‘a universal Tom Brown: loyal, brave, truthful, a 
gentleman and, if at all possible, a Christian’.7 
As one would expect, official institutional discourses within sports organizations rarely encroach 
upon this dubious (and largely hidden) history. Rather, the official discourses prefer to recognize 
only those moments of sports-related violence that have been produced by ‘enemies’ of Western 
states, such as the Nazis (the 1936 Olympics), Arab terrorists (the 1972 Olympics), or football 
hooligans (1985 Heysel disaster).8 
However, far more deadly and far more frequent have been those instances of terrorism or the 
infringement of fundamental human rights that have been initiated by states which are members 
of international sports federations and which are at least recognized, if not supported, by the 
United States and its allies. For example, it is estimated that over 500 demonstrators were 
murdered by Mexican ‘security’ forces in what became known as the Tlatelolco Massacre in 
Mexico City, ten days before the city was permitted to host the Olympic Games. Ten years later, 
FIFA gifted the World Cup finals to the junta that ruled Argentina, despite the fact that this 
‘bulwark against regional communism’ was proceeding to murder 30,000 people (mainly its own 
citizens), and to detain and torture tens of thousands more, between 1976 and 1983.9 Nor are the 
developed nations free from critical scrutiny. Prior to the 1982 Commonwealth Games in 
Brisbane, the Queensland legislature passed an Act that effectively cleared aboriginals from the 
 streets. These few points, and countless others summarized elsewhere, paint a picture of strong 
cohabitation between international sports movements and states that have systematically 
impugned the human rights of their citizens. 
The extent to which contemporary sport federations emphasize an actively humanitarian mission 
may be tested in economic and organizational terms. First, there is an obvious danger that sports 
governing bodies will hide behind the rhetoric of ‘human rights’, ‘peace’ and ‘development’, 
rather than prioritize these missions in hard cash. Comparisons of internal sports budgets are 
instructive. For example, FIFA’s ‘humanitarian support fund’ has an annual budget of two 
million Swiss francs (around £907,000) which is distributed to projects selected by the FIFA 
Finance Committee, chaired by Julio Grondona of Argentina. Among the monies disbursed in 
2003 was approximately £30,000 allocated to HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns at the fifth 
African under-17 championships in Swaziland. Compare that budget to the £5 million spent by 
FIFA’s inner circle over six weeks in Paris during the 1998 World Cup finals; or, to the further 
£1.6 million ear-marked for official ‘presents’ such as watches and pendants. According to the 
investigative journalist David Yallop, who unearthed these figures, such profligate sums might be 
better spent elsewhere: 
Imagine an injection of that money into the work being done by an 
organisation like SOS Children’s Villages–a non-denominational organisation 
founded 45 years ago and now caring directly for some 200,000 disadvantaged 
children in 125 countries. In 1994 Havelange created a FIFA Youth Fund to 
help this organisation. Perhaps Sepp Blatter can be publicly shamed into 
matching the disgusting excesses of Paris with an equivalent amount donated 
to SOS Children’s Villages.10 
Second, if we turn the spotlight more closely on international sports governing bodies such as 
the IOC and FIFA, they do not fare particularly well in terms of observing the Declaration 
through their principles and procedures. For example: 
• Article 1 emphasizes that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. 
Sports governing bodies tend to ignore egalitarianism by prioritizing elite athletes in resource 
allocation or bowing to elite interests in the largest sporting nations or institutions. 
• Article 3 insists inter alia that all have the right to ‘security of person’. Sports clubs and 
governing bodies have tended to place too little emphasis on protecting the long-term 
physical wellbeing of athletes. 
 • Article 4 insists that ‘no one shall be held in slavery or servitude’, but sports governing 
bodies offer little protection to young athletes, especially those in the developing world, who 
are signed to professional contracts that provide for little more than indentured labour. 
• Article 10 states that ‘everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal’, but sport’s ‘disciplinary procedures’ against athletes are 
often adjudicated on by officials in private. 
• Article 18 insists that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, 
but sports governing bodies traditionally take a harsh stand on those athletes who are 
deemed to ‘bring politics into the stadium’. 
• Articles 19–21 relate to the rights of people to express opinions openly, to receive and impart 
information through any media freely, to associate without hindrance, and to participate in 
government and other public services. As Chomsky points out, safeguarding these articles is 
crucial for the full and effective implementation of the Declaration. 11  However, sports 
governing bodies habitually restrict freedom of expression by disciplining those who criticize 
officials and procedures. They restrict mediation of sports to a cartel of broadcasting Trans 
National Corporations (TNCs). They employ some oppressive crowd control techniques at 
major sports venues. They countermand participation in the governance of sport, in part 
through their well-documented, secretive control of information and clientelist political 
relations. 
• Article 23 seeks to protect the working rights of individuals, including membership of trade 
unions. Sports governing bodies do little at grassroots level to protect the representative 
rights of professional athletes. 
• Article 25 states that all have rights to a ‘basic standard of living’, including health care and 
security during unemployment, sickness or old age. Sports governing bodies take no effective 
institutional steps to protect their professional athletes in this sense. 
• Article 26 stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to education’, which ‘shall be directed to the 
full development of the human personality’. Historically, among young athletes, 
specialization in sports disciplines with a view towards entering elite levels has invariably led 
to a serious deficit in other forms of education that would otherwise promote their personal 
and social development. 
• Article 27 entitles all authors of ‘artistic production’ to have their ‘moral and material 
interests’ protected. More commonly, the practices and images of elite athletes have been 
commodified with comparatively little or no recompense to the sports ‘artists’ themselves. 
 These observations would suggest that international sports federations require to go beyond the 
vague idealism of their mission statements, and to consider more precisely how their various 
constitutions and internal procedures accord with the Declaration. 
International sports governing bodies must confront the genesis of a ‘culture of rights’ that 
operates at popular and legal levels. 12 This culture is represented institutionally through the 
growth of critical NGOs, legally through the advent of human rights conventions and charters, 
informed globally through the Internet, and committed politically to challenging the cultures of 
secrecy and democratic exclusion within different systems of governance. More broadly, 
discourses and movements that pursue the globalizing of rights often connect their struggles to 
the direct challenging of the Western-driven hegemony of neo-liberal globalization. Currently, 
international sports governing bodies may feel relatively insulated from the concerted criticisms 
and protests directed by diverse ‘anti-globalization’ movements towards the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the G8, and TNCs (such as sport merchandise companies like Nike and 
Reebok). However, if one aim of these movements is to institutionalize human rights through 
sport, then it is a small step politically to refocus these campaigns at the very heart of sports 
governance. Sports federations that are popularly perceived as corrupt, unaccountable and 
undemocratic are easy targets for those embodying the new culture of rights. 
At a juridical level, as the culture of rights spreads into legal statutes and diplomatic charters, so 
claims to the autonomy or ‘exceptionalism’ of sport lose their footing. Already, international 
sporting bodies have come under pressures from national and international legal systems on the 
matters of labour markets, illicit drug use, and interpersonal violence. Sports federations might at 
least anticipate any future moves to enforce human rights conventions more fully by systematic 
reflection on their own procedures. 
Universalism, Relativism and Human Rights 
While it is important to explore the empirical and ethical disjuncture between humanitarian 
discourses and practices within international sports federations, our discussion still requires to 
theorize the conception of human rights in more critical terms, with reference to the complex 
questions of power and meaning. Are seemingly altruistic beliefs in human rights and 
development merely the velvet gloves that soften the double whammy of Western colonialism 
and neo-colonialism? Is it possible that ‘human rights’ is an essentially Western cultural 
conception that, in truth, carries no universal reach? 
 Serge Latouche provides one of the most polemical analyses of how development, human rights 
and globalization have driven the Westernization of the world. Latouche argues that the Western 
model is a ‘techno-economic machine’ that is ‘impersonal, soulless, and nowadays masterless’; 
having ‘impressed mankind into its service’, it has ‘shaken off all human attempts to stop it and 
now roves the planet’. ‘Development’ involves simply ‘aspiring to the Western model of 
consumption, the magical power of the white man, the status which went with that way of living’. 
Thus, the Western ‘anti-culture’ destroys cultural difference, imposing a triptych of development 
procedures, namely industrialization, urbanization, and ‘nationalitarianism’ (the imposition of the 
nation state as the only acceptable political form in world affairs). NGOs are part of the same 
‘game’, pursuing ‘some kind of world domination’ by reaching the furthest corners. Latouche 
does claim that ‘uniformity has its limits’: other cultures can resist Westernization by retaining 
‘their own ways of spending leisure time, and their own foods – even in the great metropolises of 
Africa, Asia or Latin America’. With regard to ‘human rights’, Latouche falls back on a cultural 
relativism argument. The West has no universal, rational grounds for challenging or preventing 
practices in other cultures that it deems to be ‘uncivilized’ or inhumane. The old and extreme 
illustration (Western horror of cannibalism) is trotted out to argue that Western rationalism is 
really founded upon ethnocentricity.13 
Sport, for Latouche, can only be implicated in this violent invention of the ‘Third World’. Sport 
promotes forms of international record-setting that can entail cultural annexation – for example, 
no Tibetan ever attempted to climb Everest, but the societies around the Himalayas have since 
become reorganized to facilitate Western competitors. Sport advocates the performance-directed 
freedom of individuals to participate, to possibly win, thereby nourishing hopes of deliverance 
from poverty, but of course, as in the capitalist marketplace, only a handful of participants really 
succeed.14 
International sport bodies, as NGOs, may be considered to be involved in building ‘world 
domination’ through pushing their little sporting flags into new territories, for example through 
funding development projects in war-torn African regions where states exist only in theory. 
Some Third World cultures might produce alternative, more fraternal sporting practices that 
stand in marked contrast to the aggressive nationalism stoked in Western contexts. But it 
remains highly problematic to construct categorically different forms of body culture to those 
institutionalized and inculcated by Western organizations like the IOC or FIFA. 
 Post-modern social theorists agree with these arguments on fundamental cultural differences, but 
can identify greater cultural agency in non- Western societies. Baudrillard, for example, makes an 
important analytical differentiation between three contemporary global forces: ‘globalization’ that 
relates mainly to neo-liberal exchange relations; ‘universality’ that relates to Enlightenment values 
such as democracy, human rights and liberty; and ‘singularity’ that relates to ‘languages, cultures, 
individuals and characters, but also chance, accident, etc. – all that the universal, in keeping with 
its law, impugns as an exception or anomaly’. Characteristically, Baudrillard reckons that 
universality has come off worst: ‘the concepts of liberty, democracy and human rights cut a very 
pale figure indeed, being merely the phantoms of a vanished universe’. While globalization is 
strongly placed, it is not certain to be the winner; singularity provides regular irruptions of 
conflict and challenge through ‘forces which are not only different, but antagonistic and 
irreducible’.15 
There are obvious benefits in these general critiques of the interrelations between human rights, 
development and cultural ‘singularity’. They draw potent historical connections between political 
economic exploitation and specific cultural practices within sports. They help us to maintain a 
self-critical reflexivity towards the apparent altruism and declared universal benefits of specific 
aspects of our culture, particularly in relation to human rights and sport. 
However, I am concerned that these kinds of cultural relativism regarding human rights harbour 
three core weaknesses that carry strong practical consequences. 
First, in political terms these arguments fail to consider how claims to ‘radical cultural difference’ 
may by forwarded by non-Western elites to justify their oppressive powers. For example, are we 
to ignore the prohibitions, violence and killings surrounding women’s football teams in Algeria, 
on the grounds of ‘radical cultural difference’?16 
Second, in anthropological terms these arguments freeze, in time and space, other cultures as 
‘authentic’, rather than seeing such cultures as essentially fluid, hybrid and inherently dynamic 
matrices of meaning. In turn, the culturally relativist arguments imply that, in rejecting the 
‘development’ path, we should return to some notional cultural arrangement without explaining 
either the social system to be founded as substitute or how future relations with developed 
nations can be managed. Hence, the harassment of Algerian women’s football teams represents 
one of many cultural and political responses within a dynamic socio-cultural context. If Western 
development workers and sports-centred NGOs step back from this context, they privilege de 
facto one set of arguments (opposition to women in sport and public life) over other positions. 
 Third, in analytical terms relativist arguments may be advanced to protect the interests of 
Western elites as well as non-Western autocrats. As Chomsky indicates, there is an odious 
‘relativism’ in the opposition of the United States, for example, towards the full implementation 
of the Declaration or to the progressive egalitarianism of the United Nations, Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).17 Similarly, in sport, we need to oppose those 
Western federations that consider the issue of rights to be more important for ‘civilizing’ non-
Western societies rather than looking more closely at their own backyard. 
This is not to deny that there is a real tension between universalism and rights-protection in the 
codes of human rights. On one hand, human rights standards may enshrine trans-cultural respect 
for difference, providing a shelter for minority peoples and practices. On the other hand, more 
weightily, human rights provide for a selective critique of cultural difference on the basis of 
‘antirelativist standards’.18 Non-Western peoples are clearly cognizant of this dilemma. The most 
successful strategy towards dealing with the dilemma is not to insist upon the cross-cultural 
unintelligibility of ‘human rights’, or to permit elite groups to rebuff enlightened overtures. 
Instead, indigenous peoples adopt a more practical strategy, in terms of probing human rights 
standards and international state conventions, to explore spaces that facilitate reform. From the 
Western perspective, we are still left with the question of how we should articulate clearer 
sociological and political-philosophical perspectives for relating human rights to senses of 
cultural difference. 
Human Rights, Globalization and Sentimental Education 
To develop a path out of these problems, I think it is helpful to relocate our concern with 
human rights and ‘humankind’ more sociologically, before exploring a political-philosophical 
response to cross-cultural communication. What I propose is to consider Robertson’s 
theorization of human rights relative to globalization, in conjunction with Rorty’s conception of 
Western ‘sentimental education’.19 
Robertson has argued that, despite its language of individualism, the political rise of human 
rights reflects a stronger ‘thematization of humanity’ as part of the globalization processes of 
recent years. For Robertson, ‘humankind’ is one of four ‘elemental reference points’, the other 
three being the individual, the nation-state, and international society. Since the 1870s, the 
interplay of these reference points has increasingly determined the shape and texture of 
globalization. Our sharpened understanding of humankind is reflected in contemporary debates 
regarding not only collective human rights, but also the future of the human species and its 
 relationships to the environment. It is further indicated in the thematization of the possibility 
that the world may somehow be made ‘for-itself’, rather than simply ‘in itself’.20 
This vision is challenged by rival discourses and processes that emphasize untrammelled 
individual agency in the marketplace, the inalienable sovereignty of nation-states, and the 
Realpolitik of international diplomacy. Consequently, Robertson identifies four visions of world 
order that correspond respectively with each of these reference points. Humankind is at the 
heart of what Robertson classifies as the ‘global gemeinschaft 2’ model, and this considers global 
order as achievable only through establishing ‘a fully globewide community’ that is underpinned 
by a ‘commitment to the communal unity of the human species’. There are two versions of the 
‘global gemeinschaft 2’ model: the first, centralized version advocates the creation of a ‘global 
village’ with a ‘globewide Durkheimian conscience collective’; the second, decentralized version 
anticipates a more pluralistic form of world community.21 
In a prior paper, we have sought to explore how this thematization of humankind may be 
concretized within the sport of football.22 Now, as we have indicated already, there are more 
than enough counter-examples to show that sport connects to other world visions dominated 
alternatively by freewheeling individualism, Machiavellian statecraft or turbulent international 
affairs. Yet we may also note that elements in sport carry both the centralized and decentralized 
visions of the humankind (global gemeinschaft 2) model. Centrally, the ‘global village’ is most 
potently represented through globe-wide mass media coverage of tournaments such as the 
Olympic Games; and, the ‘conscience collective’ is envisaged by global sports federations that 
endeavour to have all competing nations recognize and embody the official rules and ethics 
within sports. De-centrally, the notion of a ‘pluralistic world community’ is surely the logical 
culmination of the ‘sincere internationalism’ identified by Morgan in the Olympism of Coubertin. 
For Morgan, Coubertin’s goals were akin to those of liberals like Rorty, namely to have people 
‘soften, but, per impossible, not nullify their ethnocentrism by enlarging their range of 
acquaintance . . . to get them to see that their cherished beliefs and ways of life are only one 
among many other such beliefs and ways of life’.23 
The reference to Rorty here is opportune, since his more specific reflections on human rights 
help us, in my view, to clarify the inter-relations between human rights, cross-cultural dialogue 
and sport. According to Rorty, we should embrace neither ‘cultural relativism’ nor its universalist 
opponent (a pro-Western ‘foundationalism’). Rather, in a point that I consider highly compatible 
with Robertson’s view, Rorty insists that we should accept that ours is a ‘human rights culture’. 
 Rorty insists that it is better to be born into this human rights culture rather than somewhere 
more ‘deprived’. Even the most detestable characters (such as ethnic cleansers or gang rapists) 
must be viewed as deprived, wherein deprivation is defined by the absence, of Western 
conditions that enable a sufficiently risk-free existence, and of the adequate thematization of 
human suffering that we take for granted in the media and the arts. 
Our task is generally to make the human rights culture ‘more self-conscious and more powerful’ 
by producing ‘generations of nice, tolerant, well-off, secure, other-respecting students’. Rorty 
recommends that these students receive a ‘sentimental education’, which involves ‘manipulating 
their sentiments in such a way that they imagine themselves in the shoes of the despised and 
oppressed’. Rorty recognizes that sentimental education has problems in Western culture. We 
presume that reason is a more powerful force than sentiment. We fear that privileging sentiment 
politically will entail pinning our hopes on the condescension of ‘rich bleeding hearts’ like Bill 
Gates. More practically, ‘sentimental education only works on people who can relax long enough 
to listen’.24 
Yet, it is the ‘long, sad, sentimental story’ that works best to convince others that we should care 
about strangers, even those whose practices are strikingly alien to our own. We must put our 
cultural sceptics into the shoes of the stranger, to explain how it is ‘to be in her situation – to be 
far from home, among strangers’. Or we might imagine the stranger as within our kin and kind, 
to suggest she ‘might become your daughter-in-law’.25 
Rorty’s argument is not without weaknesses. It does not provide the most systematically 
reasoned account of how the foundationalism–cultural relativism debate can be concluded rather 
than evaded. More sociologically, he does not have an adequate account of how ‘sentimental 
education’ can co-habit with pre-existing geometries of power. Are not our children, for example, 
encouraged to become more sentimental towards distant peoples whose religious and diplomatic 
ties are close to the West? Nevertheless, as Brown notes, Rorty does present the understanding 
of rights as intrinsic to ‘a functioning ethical community’ alongside the problems connected to 
any universalist application of human rights.26 
I consider Rorty’s argument to be particularly worthy of elaboration in the case of sport. Sport 
arguably provides for cross-cultural encounters with the other, forcing us into bodily and 
normative dialogue with those that we might find ‘irrational’ or culturally abominable. Playing 
sport competitively forces us to think ourselves into the shoes of the opponent. Sport opens 
domains for advanced forms of sentimental education in regard to human rights. The global 
 institutions of sport and their universal legal frameworks allow for the strengthening of our 
‘shared moral identity which brings us together in a moral community’. 27  As part of the 
recreational realm, sport operates in the main within the ‘relaxation time’ in which sentimental 
education may work. The pre-event biopics and short documentaries on North African female 
runners or Middle East football teams should contribute to the establishment of sympathy 
among those in the West who would otherwise miss thematizations of deprivation. 
There are potential problems, of course. Sentimental education might be refracted through 
mediation to become another form of condescension: that is, the hypostatized melodrama of 
deprivation, the playing upon sentimentality to narrate ‘remarkable’ and ‘exceptional’ stories of 
individual achievement to the detriment of context and an ethical education. Moreover, the 
thinking of ourselves into the shoes of others should not be dazzled by commodity fetishism, as 
we buy ourselves literally into their Nikes or Reeboks. Despite these problems, sport still 
provides perhaps the most culturally popular medium through which senses of moral obligation 
towards absolute strangers might be communicated through imagined belonging. We might 
suggest to our cultural fellows that caring for others is required since they might join our family; 
more likely, we could suggest that they or their friends might one day join our other cherished 
institutions, namely our sports teams. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, I accept that a significant role has been carved out for sport to play in promoting 
peace and enhancing human dignity. This does not, however, entail that we must subscribe to 
the more naïve or evangelical arguments regarding sport’s innate goodness. Rather, we must bear 
in mind the historical relationship of sport to forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism. We 
must also continue to make critical sociological analyses and judgements regarding the actual 
‘function’ (or otherwise) of sport in achieving societal objectives, such as conflict resolution or 
social rehabilitation of the traumatized within particular circumstances. Sport can have significant 
benefits within especially difficult contexts, but only when the ‘development’ projects are rooted 
in meaningful dialogue with recipient groups, and when such programmes are accompanied by 
more direct policies to alleviate disease, hunger, war and forced migration. The governing bodies 
of the most popular sports can make significant headway by recognizing the rising ‘culture of 
rights’, and by seeking to ensure that their own procedures accord closely with human rights 
standards. 
 If we examine the question of human rights and sport at a more theoretical level, then we must 
turn to discuss the universalism–relativism debate. I have sought to indicate that a cultural 
relativist approach towards reading human rights has the virtue of highlighting the 
interconnections between Western imperialism and cultural values. In this context, given some 
of the weaknesses that are set out above (and these are not exhaustive), I would suggest that the 
cultural relativism argument is best used heuristically, in exposing each element in the cross-
cultural transmission of ‘rights’ discourses and procedures within sport to questions of 
systematic doubt. 
The advanced realities of globalization are such that non-Western cultures have themselves 
turned to pursuing advantageous spaces within the context of rights discourses. In the 
globalization process set out by Robertson, the rise of human rights and thematization of 
‘humankind’ gives rise to two particular visions of global community in contrast to other forms 
of global arrangement. Such particular visions are themselves rather particular to the West. 
Developing this point, through Rorty, we might consider the West to be the ‘human rights 
culture’, still heavily influenced by Enlightenment values, yet most capable of communicating 
these mores, not simply through reason, but ‘sentimental education’. 
Rorty’s points therefore remind us that there is much to do at home in strengthening the status 
of human rights, to educate future generations into recognizing the everyday social significance 
of these values. The rapid mobility of elite sports athletes, and in particular their transfer across 
Western sports clubs and nations, has the capacity to demonstrate to us how fateful our 
membership is of any ‘community of fate’, whether this relates to a club allegiance or to 
nationality. In sport, therefore, we must avoid the reduction of ‘human rights’ to pure 
sentimentalism, empty rhetoric, and anodyne photo-shoots. Taking human rights seriously 
necessitates the internal transformation of Western societies and the sports institutions 
themselves, as well as engaging empathetically, dialogically, with non-Western cultures. 
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